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I. Introduction
Within wealthy countries, such as the US, there exist significant spatial heterogeneity in economic outcomes. In October 2015, Bismarck, North Dakota had the lowest unemployment rate (at 1.8%) among metropolitan areas; Yuma, Arizona had the highest (at 23.2%). 1 Even within a single state, such heterogeneity occurs. For example, across counties in Texas, the unemployment rate in 2014 varied from 1.7% (McMullen County) to 13.5% (Starr County). 2 Kline and Moretti (2013) state that, at any point in time, variation in the unemployment rate across locations is comparable to variation over the business cycle. Moretti (2011) notes that such spatial variation extends beyond the unemployment rate to other outcomes such hourly wages, total factor productivity, and firm innovation.
In response to such heterogeneity, place-based policies have become an increasingly common component of regional economic development programs since the 1970s. The defining characteristic of place-based policies is that they entail transfers of government resources to places, rather than individuals. Ladd (1994) further delineates among government transfer policies by differentiating between "pure place strategies" and "place-based people strategies."
The former refers to policies designed to improve specific geographic areas (such as a downtown area) for reasons that may be independent of the well-being of the residents (or for reasons related to the well-being of individuals outside the immediate area of focus). The latter refers to policies designed to improve specific geographic areas for reasons directly related to the wellbeing of the residents (such as neighborhoods with a high concentration of poverty). Both types of place-based policies can be contrasted with people-based policies that transfer government resources to specific individuals regardless of place of residence (Neumark and Simpson 2015) .
Place-based policies date back to at least the Great Depression in the US and the creation of the Tennessee Valley Authority. 3 Since the 1970s, numerous other placed-based policies have come into existence around the globe. Accetturo and de Blasio (2012, p. 15 ) state that "governments around the globe are now actively engaged in programs to spur local economic development in backward areas." These include US state and federal programs, European Union policies, programs in Asia, etc. Kline and Moretti (2014) and Neumark and Simpson (2015) provide an excellent account. However, while the goal of economic policy is often to ensure political stability through greater equity (Accetturo and de Blasio 2012) , Busso et al. (2013, p. 897) argue that "economists have traditionally expressed little support" for place-based programs out of fear that "they will generate large distortions in economic behavior." Indeed, Gobillon et al. (2012, p. 881 ) describes place-based policies as "rather controversial," as does Mayer et al. (2015) .
In this paper, we empirically assess the causal effects of a particular place-based policy, the Texas Enterprise Zone Program (TEZP), on the financial well-being of residents. In general, enterprise zones (EZs) create incentives for job creation and/or capital investment in areas containing or adjacent to concentrated poverty (Neumark and Simpson 2015) . Thus, in Ladd's (1994) categorization, the TEZP is an example of a place-based people strategy. In Neumark and Simpson's (2015) terminology, the TEZP can be further described as a "direct" place-based people strategy in that the program seeks to improve the well-being of residents in or around disadvantaged areas through improved local labor market conditions rather than relocating such individuals. While discussed in more detail in the next section, the goal of the TEZP is to create "an economic development tool for local communities to partner with the State of Texas to promote job creation and significant private investment that will assist economically distressed areas of the state." 4 Numerous empirical evaluations of EZs have appeared in the recent literature. As these are extensively reviewed in Neumark and Simpson (2015) , we do not provide a detailed account 4 measurement of enterprise zone boundaries, choice of control locations, isolation of EZ effects from those of other policies, and spillovers (Neumark and Simpson 2015) .
Our analysis of the TEZP adds to the current literature along several dimensions. First, and foremost, we move beyond a "narrow" focus on employment and wages and assess the causal effect of the program on the financial well-being of residents. Specifically, we utilize detailed information on all household debts, delinquencies, and credit scores from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax, a quarterly longitudinal 5% random sample of all individuals in the US with a social security number and a credit report. As a result, we are able to assess the impact of enterprise zones on the financial situation of residents. This responds to calls in the literature for a "more comprehensive estimation" of "additional welfare indicators" (Accetturo and de Blasio 2012, p. 24 ). In addition, by examining delinquencies, bankruptcies, and credit scores, we are able to focus on outcomes that speak directly to the status of disadvantaged individuals living in the target areas. Outcomes directly related to the welfare of the disadvantaged are less common in the current EZ literature (Hellerstein and Neumark 2012) .
Second, the TEZP avoids many of the identification issues raised above. Zone boundaries under the program correspond to Census block groups, thereby avoiding measurement error in coverage. Program rules defining zones are straightforward and transparent, making the choice of control locations -and resulting identification assumptionsalso straightforward and transparent. The existence of other local benefits through the federal Empowerment Zone, Renewal Community, or Enterprise Community programs is addressed in the sample construction. Spillovers can be tested. Indeed, Freedman (2013) employs an identical identification strategy as we adopt here to assess the causal effect of the TEZP on employment growth, population characteristics, and housing market conditions. He finds positive effects on employment growth in lower-paying industries and median home values and a negative effect on the vacancy rate.
Prior to continuing, it is necessary to comment on the importance of moving beyond employment and wage outcomes when assessing the benefits of EZs. Glaeser and Gottlieb (2008) , Moretti (2011) , and Kline and Moretti (2014) discuss the welfare implications of placebased policies after accounting for worker mobility and housing rents. One standard result is that with perfectly mobile workers and perfectly inelastic housing supply, all benefits of place-based 5 policies will be capitalized into land rents. In this case, employment and wage impacts of such policies provide a very misleading measure of the benefit to non-landowners. Moretti (2011 Moretti ( , p. 1297 writes: "In the case of high elasticity of local labor supply and less than infinite elasticity of housing supply, this increase in housing prices will offset most of the welfare gains that might otherwise accrue to existing residents… In this setting, location-based redistributive policies intended to help areas with low nominal income have virtually no effect on the utility of workers.
The only beneficiaries of this policy are landowners in the targeted areas." Briant et al. (2015, p. 93) affirm that the result could be the "capture" of the benefits of place-based policies by "untargeted populations."
Indeed, the existing empirical studies that do examine mobility and housing market conditions suggest that this straightforward theoretical result may not be unrealistic. Freedman (2013) finds an 11.3% increase in median home values in locations covered under the TEZP. Krupka and Noonan (2009) and Busso et al. (2013) document large increases -between roughly 25 and 40 percent -in house values in US federal EZs. Hanson (2009) finds an increase in median, self-reported property values of over $100,000 in US federal EZs. Reynolds and Rohlin (2015) find an increase in house values for houses valued above $100,000. Engberg and Greenbaum (1999) analyze state-level EZ programs and document an increase in housing values in areas with initially low vacancy rates. However, the evidence on the rental price of housing is much weaker. Busso et al. (2013) and Reynolds and Rohlin (2015) , for example, find little to no impact on rents.
The empirical evidence linking place-based policies with worker mobility is also much weaker. Krupka and Noonan (2009) actually find negative effects of US federal EZs on population density and positive effects on vacancy rates. Busso et al. (2013) find no statistically significant effects on population or vacancy rates. On the other hand, Freedman (2013) documents a four percent decline in vacancy rates under the TEZP, but no statistically significant change in the population. Reynolds and Rohlin (2015) find some evidence of a polarizing impact of US federal EZs; the density of low-and high-income households increase, whereas the density of middle-income households declines.
In sum, the impact of place-based policies on the welfare of residents depends on the combined effects of such policies on the labor market and the cost of living, which in turn depend on worker mobility and housing supply. While the net effect is difficult to measure 6 directly, examination of the financial well-being of residents -using detailed information found in individual credit reports -allows us to better assess the efficacy of EZs (as implemented under the TEZP). In doing so, we find little beneficial causal impact of the TEZP on the financial wellbeing of residents. At best, we find a modest positive impact on the repayment of retail loans.
However, we find evidence of an increase in the delinquency rates of auto loans, as well as in
Chapter 13 bankruptcy filings.
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides some background on the TEZP.
Section 3 discusses the empirical methodology and data. Section 4 presents our findings.
Section 5 concludes.
II. The Texas Enterprise Zone Program
In It should be noted that, to our knowledge, there is limited auditing by the state to ensure that the number of announced new jobs are in fact created and filled according to the guidelines.
III. Empirics
A. Baseline Model
With our baseline model we seek to estimate the causal effect of EZ designation under the TEZP on a variety of outcomes related to the financial well-being of residents. As noted in Hellerstein and Neumark (2012) and Neumark and Simpson (2015) , causal evaluations of placebased programs confront two econometric challenges. First, often the boundaries of the program do not align with the boundaries available in the data. This results in a problem of measurement error. Second, as locations covered by placed-based programs are not chosen at random, overcoming selection bias is critical. This entails carefully choosing areas to be included in the control group.
Fortunately, the design of the TEZP makes it relatively straightforward to overcome these challenges. First, areas designated EZs under the TEZP follow the census block group boundaries. Thus, the boundaries used under the program align perfectly with the data used in the analysis. Second, the institutional rules of the TEZP allow one to utilize a regression discontinuity (RD) approach to estimate the impact of the TEZP (Lee and Lemieux 2010).
Following Freedman (2013) , we estimate the impact of the TEZP on local consumer finance using the following basic estimating equation
where ∆ is the change in the outcome measure, , from 2002:Q4 to the terminal period (either 2006:Q4 or 2009:Q4) for census block group , is a binary variable equal to one if location is an EZ, is the census block group poverty rate, is a vector of baseline covariates, and is a mean zero error term allowed to be arbitrarily correlated within counties.
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In our estimation sample, we exclude census block groups that are located in a distressed county or in a Federal Empowerment Zone, Renewal Community, or Enterprise Community. 10 Thus, the model in (1) fits nicely in the sharp RD framework, where (•) is a control function with the following general form
and is the order of the polynomial. Thus, the relationships between the poverty rate and the outcomes are allowed to be different on opposite sides of the cutoff (i.e., a poverty rate of 20%).
This permits heterogeneity of the function across the threshold (see also Freedman 2012, Bronzini and Iachini 2014) .
Prior to continuing, two comments are warranted. First, in the sharp RD approach, the key identifying assumption that must hold for 1 to have a causal interpretation is that census block groups are sufficiently similar in a narrow window around the poverty rate cutoff of 20%.
In our baseline specification, we only include census block groups with a poverty rate between 18 and 22 percent. Figure 2 shows the treatment and control block groups used in the estimation.
However, despite using this narrow window, identification still requires localities be unable to manipulate which side of the cutoff they lie. As discussed in Freedman (2013) 
B. Modeling Spillovers
A frequently voiced concern regarding place-based policies is that any gains enjoyed by targeted locations come at the expense of adjacent, non-targeted locations (Neumark and Simpson 2015) . This has two salient implications. First, estimated treatment effects may overstate the benefits to targeted locations if adjacent locations are in the control group. Second, the net benefits of such policies may be zero if the harm done to non-targeted locations offset the gains to the targeted locations. If so, rather than promoting job creation, such policies would simply spatially redistribute economic activity. However, it is also plausible that positive spillovers may be generated through agglomeration externalities. In the case of the TEZP, positive spillovers may also arise because the program does not require that projects be physically located within an EZ.
To address these issues, we perform the following two exercises. First, we re-estimate the model in (1) excluding census block groups that border any EZ under the TEZP (i.e., regardless of whether they border a block group that qualifies for EZ status based on the 20% poverty rate rule, the distressed county designation, or the Federal Empowerment Zone, Renewal
Community, or Enterprise Community designation) from the control group. If the estimated treatment effects become muted (amplified) after eliminating adjacent census block groups from the control group, then this is consistent with negative (positive) externalities from the program on adjacent locations. 11 Figure A1 in the appendix shows the treatment and control block groups used in this case.
Second, we directly estimate the causal impact of adjacency to an EZ on non-EZs using a sharp RD approach similar to the baseline model. 12 Specifically, our estimating equation is
where is a binary variable equal to one if location is not an EZ but is adjacent to an EZ, is the maximum poverty rate among all census block groups adjacent to census block group i, and all other notation is previously defined. The control function, (•), has the following general form
again allowing the relationships between the maximum poverty rate of adjacent block groups and the outcomes to differ on opposite sides of the cutoff.
When estimating (3), the sample is restricted to non-EZs with a poverty rate between 15
and (strictly less than) 20 percent, that do not border a distressed county or a Federal 11 A similar strategy is pursued in Kolko and Neumark (2010) , Freedman (2012 Freedman ( , 2013 , and Gobillon et al. (2013) . 12 A similar strategy is pursued in Ham et al. (2011) , Givord et al. (2013) , and Hanson and Rohlin (2013) .
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Empowerment Zone, Renewal Community, or Enterprise Community, and whose maximum poverty rate among all neighboring census block groups is between 18 and 22 percent. Thus, 1 is identified by comparing non-EZs surrounded by locations below the 20% cutoff (and not otherwise classified as an EZ due to the distressed county designation or the federal programs) to non-EZs adjacent to at least one census block group with a poverty rate exceeding the 20% cutoff. As in the baseline model, 1 should be interpreted as a LATE. Figure A2 in the appendix shows the treatment and control block groups used to estimate (3).
C. Data
The data are obtained from a variety of sources. (2015), delinquencies are important as they are a sign of financial distress, represent the first-stage of default, and often lead to penalties such as late fees or higher interest rates.
We aggregate this information to the census block group level to form the following outcomes of interest: median Equifax credit risk score, percentage of prime (above 680), near prime (620-680), and sub-prime (below 620) risk scores, percentage in Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 bankruptcy, median number of credit inquiries and new accounts opened, percentage of auto loans, credit cards, retail loans, first mortgages, and all accounts that are delinquent, severely delinquent, and in bankruptcy, and the median amount of outstanding debt of each type.
Summary statistics are provided in Tables A1-A3 . The most important takeaway from the summary statistics is the fact that the treatment and control groups are very similar in terms of baseline demographic characteristics once the sample is restricted to census block groups within the two percent bandwidth around the 20% cutoff (Table A1 ). Obviously the poverty rate becomes more similar; the difference in means falls from 23 to two percentage points moving from the full sample to the estimation sample.
The treatment and control groups also become noticeably more similar in terms of population size, size of the labor force, racial composition, educational distribution, median household income, and housing market attributes.
In terms of changes in credit outcomes, a few interesting patterns emerge after focusing on the restricted sample of census block groups within the two percent bandwidth around the 20% cutoff. First, the average increase in the median risk score is modestly higher in the While the summary statistics are interesting, they do not control for differences in the poverty rate -and small differences in demographic characteristics -across the treatment and control groups. So, we now turn to the sharp RD estimates.
IV. Results
A. Baseline Specification
The baseline results, based on equation (1) using the two percent bandwidth, are presented in Table 2 and 3. Table 2 provides the results for the aggregate financial outcomes, 14 while Table 3 presents the results for specific loan types. Each table presents results over the   2002:Q4-2006:Q4 and 2002:Q4-2009:Q4 periods. In Table 2 , the causal effect of EZ designation is statistically significant for only one of 22 outcomes -change in the percentage of residents filing Chapter 13 bankruptcy over the 2002:Q4-2006:Q4 period -and the effect is positive. None of the remaining coefficient estimates are statistically significant at even the p<0.10 level. Thus, as measured by overall financial well-being, there is no evidence that EZ designation under the TEZP improved the welfare of residents, and perhaps some evidence to the contrary. Moreover, the adverse impact on bankruptcy filings is noteworthy given the more than three-fold rise in the personal bankruptcy rate in the US between 1980 and 2000 (Livshits 2015) .
Turning to the analysis of specific loan types, several findings emerge. 16 In sum, the overall results point to a minimal impact of EZ designation under the TEZP on the overall financial well-being of individuals. While there is some evidence of a beneficial effect as it relates to retail loans, there is also evidence of adverse effects on auto loan and mortgage delinquency and Chapter 13 bankruptcy filings. 17 The modest impact is consistent with the analysis of the TEZP in Freedman (2013) . He finds positive effects on employment growth, but concentrated among low-paying jobs (see also Greenbaum 2007, Mayer et al. 2015) . Moreover, he documents a significant rise in home values and fall in vacancy rates. Thus, Freedman's (2013, p. 342) conjecture that these findings "tend to erode any improvement in overall welfare owing to the program" appears on the mark. Moreover, our results are in line with the standard theoretical result, discussed in Kline and Moretti (2014) , that all gains from place-based policies are capitalized into land values if labor is perfectly mobile and housing supply is perfectly inelastic.
Before turning to additional specifications to test for spillovers, we conduct two sensitivity analyses. First, we explore the impact of using alternative bandwidths -0.01, 0.03, 0.05, and 0.10 -around the cutoff. The results are provided in Tables A4-A9 in the appendix.   Tables A4 and A5 Aside from the Chapter 13 bankruptcy results, the only other outcomes that produce some statistically significant results relate to credit scores and the median number of credit inquiries.
With respect to credit scores, we find modest evidence of a negative (positive) and statistically significant impact on the change in percentage of individuals with a prime (near prime) risk score. This, too, is not a welfare-improving outcome. In terms of the change in median number of credit inquiries, there is modest evidence that EZ designation reduces the number of credit inquiries over the prior three or 12 months when using the 2002:Q4-2009:Q4 period.
Turning to the loan-specific results, a few findings are noteworthy. First, the positive and statistically significant effect of EZ designation on the change in the percentage of borrowers delinquent on auto loans and the percentage of auto loan balances in delinquency over the 2002:Q4-2006:Q4 period remains in the majority of cases. There is also some evidence of a positive statistically significant effect on the change in the percentage of borrowers severely delinquent on auto loans. As in Table 3 , there is never any statistically significant impact on auto loans over the 2002:Q4-2009:Q4 period.
Second, we continue to find no meaningful evidence of an effect of EZ designation on bank card activity; only two of the 40 coefficients are statistically significant at the p<0.10 level. The next sensitivity analysis we perform entails assessing the effects of crossing placebo cutoffs. Specifically, reverting back to the two percent bandwidth, we use cutoffs of 17.5% and 22.5%. For the former, we retain census block groups with a poverty rate between 15.5 and 19.5 percent, and designate block groups with a poverty rate above 17.5% as the treatment group. For the latter, we retain census block groups with a poverty rate between 20.5 and 24.5 percent, and designate block groups with a poverty rate above 22.5% as the treatment group. The results using the 17.5% cutoff are presented in Tables A10 and A11 . The results using the 22.5% cutoff are presented in Tables A12 and A13 .
Tables A10 and A12 contain the results for the aggregate financial outcomes. Of the 44 coefficient estimates, only three are statistically significant at the p<0.10 level, consistent with what one would expect by chance. Tables A11 and A13 contain the results for the loan-specific outcomes. Of the 80 coefficient estimates, 11 are statistically significant at the p<0.10 level,
slightly higher than what one would expect by chance. In total, 14 of 124 coefficients estimates are statistically significant at the p<0.10 level, or 11.3%, essentially what one would expect by chance.
In conclusion, the results of the two sensitivity analyses do little to alter the findings from our baseline model. EZ designation under the TEZP has a beneficial impact on retail loan delinquency rates, but has little beneficial impact on other measures of financial well-being. In fact, there is some evidence of an adverse impact on auto loan and mortgage activity, as well as
B. Spillovers
As discussed above, placed-based policies may generate spillovers of nearby locations.
Such spillovers may be negative if economic activity is displaced from non-EZs to EZs, or may be positive if the benefits of an EZ cross the EZ border. Moreover, in either case, the presence of spillovers may impact the estimates from the baseline model to the extent that non-EZs that are close to EZs are in the control group. In the case of the TEZP, spillovers are especially likely since the TEZP does not require projects physically locate in an EZ. The program instead places residency requirements on new hires. We now turn to the results of our investigation into the presence of spillovers.
B.1. Alternative Control Group
To begin, we alter the definition of the control group. We continue to use a two percent bandwidth, however we now exclude census block groups that border any EZ (i.e., regardless of how it qualifies as an EZ). Thus, the sample size is reduced relative to the baseline model. The results are presented in Tables 4 and 5.
In terms of the aggregate financial outcomes (Table 4) None of the other effects are statistical significant at conventional levels.
Turning to the loan-specific outcomes, two findings stand out. First, we find even stronger effects on retail loan activity. Specifically, reductions in delinquency rates are even larger in magnitude and are statistically significant at conventional levels more often. We also now find some evidence of a reduction in delinquency rates of bank cards over the 2002:Q4-2009:Q4 period as well. Second, the positive effect and statistically significant effect of EZ designation on auto loan delinquency rates over the 2002:Q4-2006:Q4 period persists.
Together, then, the results point to spillover effects on bordering non-EZs in the same direction as the direct effects on EZs. Given the institutional rules of the TEZP, this is not surprising. However, it is in contrast with many other evaluations of place-based programs that find evidence of negative spillovers in terms of economic activity (e.g., Givord et al. 2013 , Hanson and Rohlin 2013 , Mayer et al. 2015 .
B.2. Alternative Treatment Definition
Our second test for spillovers alters the definition of the treatment (and hence the control group as well). As shown in (3), the sample is restricted to census block groups with a poverty rate between 15 and (strictly less than) 20 percent. For each block group in the sample, we compute the maximum poverty rate among its contiguous neighboring block groups. The treatment group is defined as those census block groups whose maximum poverty rate among its contiguous neighboring block groups is between 20 and 22 percent. The control group is defined as those census block groups whose maximum poverty rate among its contiguous neighboring block groups is between 18 and 20 percent. Thus, this set up still aligns with the sharp RD framework. However, the sample size is small.
Results are shown in Tables 6 and 7 . Among the 62 coefficient estimates, only two are statistically significant at conventional levels. As such, given the lack of precision due to the small sample size, we resist giving these results much weight.
V. Conclusion
Despite the long history of place-based policies playing a prominent role in regional economic development initiatives, the theoretical and empirical evidence of their efficacy is limited. The overall impact of such policies on welfare depends on their ability to generate investment and employment growth, as well as their impact on individual mobility and the costof-living. Existing studies have examined different pieces of these outcomes, making conclusions regarding overall effects on welfare difficult to draw.
Here, we explore one such program, the Texas Enterprise Zone Program. Taking advantage of the unique institutional rules of the Texas program, along with unique data provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax, we are able to assess the direct impact of the program on the financial well-being of residents. In doing so, 20 we find little beneficial causal impact of the program. At best, we find a modest positive impact on the repayment of retail loans. However, we also find evidence of an increase in the delinquency rates on auto loans, as well as in Chapter 13 bankruptcy filings.
While these findings are illuminating, they also come with some caveats. First, while the regression discontinuity estimates provided here have a high degree of internal validity, their external validity is uncertain. In particular, the results may not generalize to other cutoffs aside from the 20% cutoff currently in use under the program. Moreover, the results may be specific to the peculiarities of the Texas program, such as the fact that census block groups meeting the poverty rate threshold are automatically designated as enterprise zones without having to apply, projects under the program need not physically local in an enterprise zone, and auditing of projects undertaken as a result of the program is questionable Engberg 2000, Freedman 2013 ). In particular, Bondonio and Greenbaum (2007) find that US state enterprise zone programs are more effective if they utilize a competitive application process resulting in a small number of zones; not an attribute of the Texas program.
Second, much of the recent literature explores various sources of heterogeneity in the effects of enterprise zones. Kolko and Neumark (2010) , for example, uncover several sources of heterogeneity even when focusing on a program in a single state (California). Here, we focus solely on the average effect of enterprise zone designation under the Texas program.
Nonetheless, the lack of strong evidence that the Texas program has improved the financial wellbeing of enterprise zone residents on average is significant in light of the costs involved, consistent with Glaeser and Gottlieb's (2008, p. 155 ) claim that enterprise zones are "expensive relative to their achievements." Table A1 Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Sample restricted to Census block groups with a poverty rate between 0.15 and 0.20 in 2000. Treatment group is defined as block groups with a maximum poverty rate amongst its contiguous neighboring block groups between 0.20 and 0.22. Control group is defined as block groups with a maximum poverty rate amongst its contiguous neighboring block groups between 0.18 and 0.20. Number of treated is 99 in Panels I and II. Number of controls is 121 and 120 in Panels I and II, respectively. Estimation is by OLS, weighted by number of individuals in the block group. Covariates include all variables listed in Table A1 
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Figure A1. Map of Treatment and Alternative Control Groups.
Notes: Treatment group consists of Census block groups with a poverty rate between 0.20 and 0.22. Control group consists of Census block groups with a poverty rate between 0.18 and 0.20 that do not border a block group with a poverty rate exceeding 0.20.
Figure A2. Map of Alternative Treatment and Control Groups.
Notes: Treatment group consists of Census block groups with a poverty rate between 0.15 and 0.20 and the maximum poverty rate among its contiguous neighbors between 0.20 and 0.22. Control group consists of block groups with a poverty rate between 0.15 and 0.20 and the maximum poverty rate among its contiguous neighbors between 0.18 and 0.20. Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Sample restricted to Census block groups a poverty rate within the listed bandwidth around 0.2 in 2000. Estimation is by OLS, weighted by number of individuals in the block group. Covariates include all variables listed in Table A1 in Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Sample restricted to Census block groups with a poverty rate between 0.155 and 0.195 in 2000. Estimation is by OLS, weighted by number of individuals in the block group. Covariates include all variables listed in Table A1 in 
